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ABSTRACT
Using individual-level data from the United States and a number of other developed countries, we
empirically investigate the role of income inequality in determining rates of early, non-marital childbearing
among low socioeconomic status (SES) women. We present robust evidence that low SES women
are more likely to give birth at a young age and outside of marriage when they live in more unequal
places, all else held constant. Our results suggest that inequality itself, as opposed to other correlated
geographic factors, drives this relationship. We calculate that differences in the level of inequality
are able to explain a sizeable share of the geographic variation in teen fertility rates both across U.S.
states and across developed countries. We propose a model of economic “despair” that facilitates the
interpretation of our results. It reinterprets the sociological and ethnographic literature that emphasizes
the role of economic marginalization and hopelessness into a parsimonious framework that captures
the concept of “despair” with an individual’s perception of economic success. Our empirical results
are consistent with the idea that income inequality heightens a sense of economic despair among those
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rates of early, non-marital childbearing vary tremendously across countries and across 
states. The United States is consistently at the high end of this distribution, with a rate of teen 
childbearing that greatly exceeds that of other developed countries. Within the United States the 
experience  is  far  from  uniform.  Some  states  have  teen  childbearing  rates  that  are  roughly 
comparable to those found in Europe, whereas others have rates that are over three times that 
level.  
These patterns are documented in Figures 1 and 2, which display teen childbearing rates 
by country and by states within the U.S., respectively.  The teen birth rate of 41.5 per 1,000 in 
the United States is a multiple of the level that exists in other developed countries. For example, 
the rate is 25.9 in the United Kingdom, 14.1 in Canada, and 4.3 in Switzerland. Figure 2 shows 
that tremendous variation exists across states as well: some states have rates that are comparable 
to those in other developed countries, but others have extremely high rates.  For example, the 
rates in Texas, New Mexico, and Mississippi (over 60 per 1,000) are more than three times the 
rates in New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Vermont.
1 As we document subsequently, these 
geographic differences are long-standing and persistent. We consider this geographic variation to 
pose both a challenge and potentially a clue in thinking about factors that may be important to 
understanding rates of early non-marital childbearing. 
Despite over four decades of research on the topic of early, non-marital childbearing, the 
best available research to date has very little to say about why these differences exist and why 
they are so persistent. Why is it that teenagers in the United States are so much more likely than 
                                                 
1 This cross-state variation in teen birth rates does not simply reflect cross-state variation in overall birth rates. The 
highest  fertility  rates  to  women  age  15-44 are  found  in Alaska,  Idaho,  and  Utah,  which rank  35, 28, and 19, 
respectively, in terms of teen birth rates (Martin et al., 2010). In addition, this cross-section variation is substantially 
larger than recent time-series variation, which has garnered so much attention. Between 1991 and 2008, the national 
teen birth rate fell from a peak of 62 to 42.  Kearney and Levine, p. 2 
their counterparts in other countries to give birth when young and unmarried? Why are teens in 
some parts of the United States so much more likely to have a teen birth than their counterparts 
in other parts of the country? In this paper we argue that the standard explanations studied by 
economists come up short of being able to explain any substantial share of the variation. We 
propose a new direction of research and present robust empirical evidence that income inequality 
can explain a substantial share of this geographic variation. 
A  striking  correlation  exists  between  income  inequality  and  aggregate  rates  of  teen 
childbearing, both across countries and across states. But places with more inequality also differ 
in many other dimensions that could affect rates of teen childbearing. To determine whether 
aggregate  inequality  measures  have  a  causal  relationship  with  rates  of  early  non-marital 
childbearing, we conduct an empirical analysis of individual level data that examines whether 
income inequality operates on individuals likely to be affected in a negative way – namely, those 
at the bottom of the income distribution. We use individual level data from the National Survey 
of Family Growth (NSFG) to look across states in the U.S. and individual level data from the 
Fertility  and  Family Survey (FFS), conducted by the  United Nations, to look across  several 
developed countries. We find that women who grew up in low socioeconomic circumstances 
have more teen, non-marital births when they live in higher inequality locations, all else equal. 
The proximate mechanism driving this finding is less frequent use of abortion.   
Of course, other geographic characteristics are likely to be correlated with inequality and 
may limit our ability to draw causal conclusions from this relationship. Our analysis controls for 
demographic characteristics of the population and a broad array of public policies that could 
otherwise pose problems for our interpretation.  We also show that our results are unchanged 
when we hold constant other economic factors, like the absolute income levels of the poor, as Kearney and Levine, p. 3 
well  as  other  potentially  important  environmental  factors  such  as  social  capital  or  political 
climate.  While  we  could  never  completely  rule  out  the  existence  of  an  omitted  factor,  the 
robustness of the relationship is striking.  
We propose a model of economic “despair” to rationalize these results. Our model is 
heavily influenced by the existing ethnographic and sociological literature on the topic, including 
the work of Clark (1965), Lewis (1969), Wilson (1987), and Edin and Kefalas (2005), among 
others. Despite specific differences, all these authors broadly view despair and hopelessness as 
playing a key role in driving rates of non-marital childbearing among the poor. Our contribution 
to this literature is to capture this qualitative idea in a parsimonious model within the economics 
paradigm of a utility-maximizing framework. We explicitly treat an early non-marital birth as 
being the result of individual decision-making.  
We focus on the idea that it is the perceived inability of poor women to improve their 
situation  through  work or  marriage  that  leads  them  to  choose  motherhood  when  young  and 
single,  rather  than  delaying  until  a  later  period.  When  a  poor  young  woman  perceives  that 
socioeconomic success is unachievable to her, she is more likely to embrace motherhood in her 
current  position,  as  there  is  little  option  value  to  be  gained  by  delaying  the  immediate 
gratification of having a baby. When there is relatively more hope of economic advancement – a 
perception that is more likely in a more equal or mobile society – it is relatively more desirable 
to delay motherhood and invest in human or social capital.
2 The operational link to the empirical 
work is that the combination of  being poor and  living  in a  more unequal (and  less  mobile) 
                                                 
2 We show subsequently that inequality and mobility are highly correlated across societies. We also discuss that 
inequality theoretically could have an opposing “aspirational” effect (more to strive for in unequal societies), so that 
the ultimate impact of inequality on teen childbearing outcomes is an empirical question. The evidence is consistent 
with our interpretation here.  Kearney and Levine, p. 4 
society contributes to the decision to have a baby when young and unmarried.  Our empirical 
results are consistent with these ideas. 
Our scholarly contribution is twofold. First, we present empirical evidence supporting the 
role of income inequality in driving rates of early, non-marital childbearing among those at the 
bottom of the income distribution. Our estimates suggest that inequality can explain a sizable 
share of the geographic variation observed in teen childbearing rates, on the order of 10 to 50 
percent. To date, no other explanation can come close to explaining as much of the geographic 
variation.  
Second, we believe our economic model of despair constitutes an important contribution 
to the literature in economics that considers so-called risky behaviors. In our conceptualization, 
these  behaviors  might  be  more  appropriately  considered  “drop  out”  behaviors,  in  so  far  as 
adolescents  are  choosing  to  drop  out  of  the  mainstream  climb  to  socio-economic  success. 
Though this paper is focused entirely on early non-marital childbearing, we believe our model is 
applicable to a number of other contexts that involve current benefits and future economic costs. 
II. REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
The standard economics model of childbearing considers an individual who maximizes 
utility over children and other consumption subject to a budget constraint (cf. Becker and Lewis, 
1973). Preferences are generally assumed to be given and stable, and explanations have focused 
on differences in constraints, often generated by particular policies and institutions. Economists 
have tended to explore the relevance of factors such as the incentives of the welfare system, the 
role  that  abortion  policy  plays,  the  impact  of  labor  market  conditions,  and  the  like.    Other 
research  has  examined  the  impact  of  an  individual’s  own  economic  disadvantage  and  her 
likelihood of having an early non-marital birth.  Kearney and Levine, p. 5 
The  political  scientist  Charles  Murray  (1986)  wrote  in  his  now-famous  book,  Losing 
Ground,  that the  welfare  system  provided  incentives  for  couples  to  have  a  child  outside  of 
marriage by reducing both the financial rewards of marriage and the financial costs of out-of-
wedlock  childbearing.  This  hypothesis  became  politically  popular  among  conservatives  and 
helped usher in an era of welfare reform. It also spawned a vast empirical literature in economics 
investigating the issue. Moffitt (1998 and 2003) provides an overview of the large literature on the 
topic, concluding that more generous welfare benefits likely have only a modest positive effect on 
rates of non-marital childbearing. With regard to the variation across countries, the lower rate of 
teen childbearing in Europe with its much more generous welfare system provides a prima facie 
case  against  the  hypothesis  that  social  support  is  largely  to  blame  for  high  rates  of  teen 
childbearing in the United States. 
Economists have also examined a host of other policy and institutional factors relevant to 
the costs of avoiding or not avoiding a non-marital or teen birth. A highly incomplete list of such 
studies  includes  previous  work  that  we  have  conducted  elsewhere  on  the  effect  of  various 
policies and environmental conditions, such as restrictive abortion policies (Levine, Trainor, and 
Zimmerman,  1996;  Levine,  2003);  welfare  reform  (Kearney,  2004);  labor  market  conditions 
(Levine,  2001)  and  access  to  affordable  contraception  (Kearney  and  Levine,  2009a).  These 
empirical studies have generally found that changes in such “prices” do have impacts on teen and 
non-marital childbearing, but individually these factors can account for only very small shares of 
the total variation in non-marital childbearing.  
Moving away from traditional economic models of fertility, Akerlof, Yellen, and  Katz 
(1996) propose a “technology shock” hypothesis for the rise in non-marital childbearing in the 
U.S. in the later 20
th century. They relate the erosion of the custom of “shotgun marriage” – the Kearney and Levine, p. 6 
practice of getting married between conception and birth -- to the legalization of abortion and the 
increased availability of contraception to unmarried women in the United States. The story is one 
of decreased bargaining power on the part of women who do not adopt either birth control or 
abortion. This theory is an intriguing explanation for the decrease in shotgun marriages in the 
U.S.  over  the  relevant  decades,  but  it  is  unlikely  to  have  much  explanatory  power  for  the 
geographic variation in outcomes since those technology shocks happened everywhere. 
Behavioral economists O’Donohue and Rabin (1999) suggest that teens are “hyperbolic 
discounters,” who place disproportionate weight on present happiness as compared to future 
well-being.  Other  scholars  suggest  that  teen  childbearing  is  attributable  to  teens’  stage  of 
cognitive development, arguing that they are not quite ready to make the types of decisions that 
would prevent a pregnancy (for example, Brooks-Gunn and Furstenberg, 1989; Hardy and Zabin, 
1991;  Brooks-Gunn  and  Paikoff,  1997).While  limited  decision-making  capacity  surely  is  an 
issue for some set of teens, we note that these claims have an element of universality to them that 
cannot begin to explain the striking differences in rates of early non-marital childbearing across 
socioeconomic groups, over time, or across states or countries. In other words, we doubt that the 
particularly high rate of teen childbearing among U.S. teens as compared to their counterparts in 
Europe can be attributed to the more limited decision making capacity -- or more present-biased 
preferences -- of the teenage brain in America. 
Another line of research considers the relationship between background disadvantage and 
rates of early childbearing (cf. Duncan and Hoffman, 1990; An, Haveman, and Wolfe, 1993; 
Lundberg and Plotnick, 1995; and Duncan, et al., 1998). It is well-known that growing up in 
disadvantaged circumstances, such as in poverty or to a single mother, is associated with much 
higher  rates  of  early  childbearing.  In  a  previous  examination  of  cohort  rates  of  early Kearney and Levine, p. 7 
childbearing, we find that the proportion of a female cohort born economically disadvantaged – 
as captured by being born to a teen mother, a single mother, or to a mother with a low level of 
education – is tightly linked to the subsequent rate of early childbearing in that cohort (Kearney 
and Levine, 2009b). But, strikingly, we find that state and year of birth fixed effects capture 
much  of  the  variation.  We  interpret  that  finding  as  suggestive  of  the  importance  of  some 
“cultural” dimension, otherwise un-modeled in that framework; we return to such an alternative 
perspective subsequently.  
Although  economists  have  been  contributing  to  discussions  of  early,  non-marital 
childbearing  for  several  decades,  the  first  contributors  to  the  discussion  were  other  social 
scientists.  Their  work  pursued  a  parallel,  rarely  (if  ever)  intersecting  track.  Daniel  Patrick 
Moynihan’s 1965 report first drew attention to the issue of non-marital childbearing among black 
families in the U.S., when the rate was one in three.
3  At about the same time, the social theories 
of the psychologist Clark (1965) and the anthropologist Lewis (1969) - who developed the theory 
of the “Culture of Poverty” - were met with controversy. Lewis (1969) wrote the following: 
The culture of poverty is both an adaptation and a reaction of the poor to their 
marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society.  It 
represents an effort to cope with the feelings of hopelessness and despair that 
develop from the realization of the improbability of achieving success in terms of 
the values and goals of the larger society … [M]any will tell you that marriage by 
law, by the church, or by both is the idea form of marriage; but few marry … 
Women often turn down offers of marriage because they feel that it ties them 
down to men who are immature, punishing, and generally unreliable (p. 189-190)  
 
This lack of opportunity was observed explicitly by Clark (1965), who wrote the following: 
                                                 
3 Moynihan (1965) argued that the deterioration of the nuclear family, and the rise of the female-headed households, 
was hindering the economic progress of blacks in the U.S. As a policy matter, he argued that it was crucial to 
improve the job prospects of black men in order to keep them engaged in the family and community as father 
figures,  and  thereby  curb  the  steady  increase  in  rates  of  out-of-wedlock  childbearing  and  divorce  that  was 
contributing to increased rates of poverty among black communities. Kearney and Levine, p. 8 
In the ghetto, the meaning of the illegitimate child is not ultimate disgrace.  There 
is not the demand for abortion or for surrender of the child that one finds in more 
privileged communities.  In the middle class, the disgrace of illegitimacy is tied to 
personal and family aspirations.  In lower-class families, on the other hand, the 
girl loses only some of her already limited options by having an illegitimate child; 
she is not going to make a “better marriage” or improve her economic and social 
status either way.  On the contrary, a child is a symbol of the fact that she is a 
woman, and she may gain from having something of her own.  Nor is the boy who 
fathers an illegitimate child going to lose, for where is he going?  The path to any 
higher status seems closed to him in any case (p. 72).  
 
The sociologist Wilson (1987) revived serious scholarship on the topic with his book The 
Truly Disadvantaged. The distinction between Wilson and Clark is largely the focus on the lack 
of jobs itself in Wilson, not the social attitude that results from the lack of jobs.  Either way, the 
lack of opportunity is what is driving the childbearing outcomes in both viewpoints, as described 
in the following excerpt:  
Thus, in a neighborhood with a paucity of regularly employed families and with 
the  overwhelming  majority  of  families  having  spells  of  long-term  joblessness, 
people  experience  a  social  isolation  that  excludes  them  from  the  job  network 
system that permeates other neighborhoods and that is so important in learning 
about or being recommended for jobs that become available in various parts of 
the  city  …  Moreover,  unlike  the  situation  in  earlier  years,  girls  who  become 
pregnant  out  of  wedlock  invariably  give  birth  out  of  wedlock  because  of  a 
shrinking pool of marriageable, that is, employed black men (p. 57).  
 
The relevant environmental factor for women in this argument is the weak marriage market that 
is attributable to the lack of jobs for men in the inner city.  Wilson is clear to point out that his 
focus is on "social isolation" and not the "culture of poverty."   
More recently, Edin and Kefalas (2005) contributed an influential ethnographic account 
of non-marital childbearing among poor women. They make the following observation:  
… the extreme loneliness, the struggles with parents and peers, the wild behavior, 
the depression and despair, the school failure, the drugs, and the general sense 
that life has spun completely out of control.  Into this void comes a pregnancy and 
then a baby, bringing the purpose, the validation, the companionship, and the 
order  that  young  women  feel  have  been  so  sorely  lacking.   In  some  profound Kearney and Levine, p. 9 
sense, these young women believe, a baby has the power to solve everything (p. 
10). 
 
From this perspective, having a baby at a young age outside the scope of marriage is not the 
result of a constraint, but something that the woman values. 
Our reading of these seminal and influential works is that they find common ground in 
the notion that growing up in an environment where there is little chance of social and economic 
advancement leads young women to bear children outside of marriage. These women perceive 
that they have so little chance for success in life not solely because of their own disadvantage, 
but also because of the environment in which they live.  They see no reason to postpone having a 
child and may even benefit from having one, regardless of marital status.
4   
This literature provides potentially useful insights regarding why some places have so 
much higher rates of early non-marital childbearing than others. Disadvantaged individuals who 
live in locations with little opportunity for economic advancement will be more likely to have an 
early, non-marital birth. We will return to these ideas subsequently in interpreting the results of 
our econometric analysis. 
III. ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
A potential clue in understanding the determinants of early, non-marital childbearing is 
the persistence in its geographic patterns.  Year-to-year and even decade-to-decade variability 
within a location is very limited.  The correlation in teen birth rates within states, for instance, 
between 1980 and 2008 is 0.92.  This suggests that longstanding differences across states are 
critical. In terms of thinking about a typical analysis of state-year level regressions, statistically 
                                                 
4 Many of these arguments, and particularly the earlier ones, focus directly on the issues of race.  The Moynihan 
Report (1965) which first broadly publicized the issue of rising non-marital fertility, also focused on race.  At the 
time, one in three births to black women was outside of marriage whereas the rate for whites was much lower.  Now 
that rates of early, non-marital childbearing are high for all women (albeit still higher for black women), our view is 
that this is less an issue of race today than it used to be. Kearney and Levine, p. 10 
the state fixed effect is paramount in explaining variation in teen childbearing research. In this 
research we are trying to see whether we can get inside the black box of that fixed effect. 
One  potential  culprit  among  many  is  income  inequality,  which  tends  to  be  fairly 
persistent  within  a  place  and  shows  a  strong  correlation  with  rates  of  early,  non-marital 
childbearing.
5 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) call attention to the correlation between inequality 
and  a  broad  range  of  “social  ills,”  including  increased  crime,  drug  use,  mortality,  and  teen 
childbearing, among others. Figures 3 and 4 present scatter plots displaying these relationships 
across developed countries and across states in a similar manner to their analysis. The correlation 
is positive, and is especially large in the case of cross-country comparisons. This correlation is 
noteworthy,  but  it does not necessarily  imply  a causal  positive relationship  between  income 
inequality and early, non-marital childbearing.
 6  
An important step in establishing a causal relationship is to determine that inequality 
operates on those who are most likely to be negatively impacted by it. With this purpose in mind, 
our primary empirical test is based on determining whether low SES women in high inequality 
locations are more likely to have an early, non-marital birth compared to higher SES women in 
those  locations.
    We  estimate  regression  models  for  a  series  of  fertility  outcomes  (birth, 
conception,  etc.)  controlling  for  year-of-birth  fixed  effects  and  state  fixed  effects.  We  also 
control for individual level demographics, public policy variables and time-varying labor market 
conditions in these models.   
                                                 
5 Using data from the 1980 and 2000 Censuses, which we describe subsequently, we find that the correlation in the 
50/10 ratio across states between those years is 0.74. 
6 Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) focuses on correlational relationships, which are merely the starting point of our 
empirical investigation. Furthermore, the robustness of their correlational relationships has been called into question 
in  other  contexts,  for  example,  see  Deaton  and  Lubotsky  (2003)  on  the  relationship  between  inequality  and 
mortality. Kearney and Levine, p. 11 
The  key  variable  in  our  models  is  the  interaction  between  long-term  measures  of 
inequality  and  a  woman's  socioeconomic  status.  We  are  interested  in  explaining  persistent 
differences  in  rates  of  early,  non-marital  childbearing  across  places.  We  therefore  focus  our 
analysis  on  “fixed”  characteristics  of  environments.  In  terms  of  inequality,  this  means  we 
empirically consider variation in long-term averages in state and national measures of income 
inequality. Note that these long-term inequality measures are perfectly correlated with the state 
fixed effects, and we thus do not separately estimate the conditional main effect.  
More formally, we estimate regression models for multiple outcomes by age 20 of the 
form: 
    0 1 2 3 4 isc s isc isc isc sc s c isc Outcome I LS LS X E                     [1]  
  
where I is our measure of inequality, LS is an indicator of low socioeconomic status, and the 
interaction term is the regressor of primary interest. The subscript i indexes individuals, s indexes 
states (or countries), and c indexes birth cohorts. The terms γs and γc represent state (or country) 
and  birth  cohort  fixed  effects,  respectively.    The  vector  X  consists  of  additional  personal 
demographic characteristics – age, age squared, race/ethnicity, and an indicator for living with a 
single parent at age 14.  
The vector E captures environmental factors including relevant public policies and labor 
market conditions in the state-year: the unemployment rate, an indicator for a welfare family cap, 
the maximum welfare benefit for a family of three, an indicator for SCHIP implementation, an 
indicator for whether the state Medicaid program covers abortion, an indicator for whether state 
abortion regulations include parental notification or mandatory delay periods, and whether the 
state Medicaid program includes expansion policies for family planning services (see Kearney 
and  Levine,  2009a  for  a  discussion  of  these  policies.  The  data  sources  used  to  create these Kearney and Levine, p. 12 
variables are described in the data appendix. By including all of these individual and state level 
controls in the model, our estimated effect of inequality for low-SES women is net of effects 
driven by policies that might be correlated with inequality.  
  Our primary question of interest is whether β1 is positive: are low-SES women in high 
inequality states relatively more likely to have a non-marital birth by age 20?  We consider the 
multiple channels through which a difference in birth rates could be realized.  First, an individual 
can take actions with regard to sexual behavior and contraceptive practices; low SES women in 
more unequal places may be more likely to get pregnant.  Second, a non-marital childbirth could 
be avoided through the choice to end a pregnancy; low SES women in more unequal places may 
be relatively less likely to choose an abortion to end her pregnancy.  And finally, non-marital 
births depend upon the parents choosing to remain unmarried after a pregnancy occurs; low SES 
women  in  more unequal places  may  be relatively  less  likely to get married  before the birth 
through a so-called “shot-gun” marriage.   
One  limitation  of  this  modeling  approach  is  that  any  other  characteristic  of  the 
socioeconomic environment that might be correlated with inequality and also directly related to 
non-marital  early  childbearing  propensities  among  low-SES  women  will  be  captured  by  our 
long-run inequality/SES interaction term. Although it is impossible to completely rule out this 
form of omitted variable bias, we examine whether introducing additional interactions of SES 
with  other  potentially  troublesome  characteristics  change  our  results.    More  formally,  we 
estimate “horse race” models that take the form:   
      0 1 2 4 4 5 isc s isc isc s isc isc sc s c isc Outcome I LS LS A LS X E                         [2] 
 Kearney and Levine, p. 13 
This  specification  is  largely  the  same  as  that  in  equation  [1]  except  that  we  now  include 
alternative  factors  (A)  that  are  time  invariant  within  states  (not  countries,  as  we  describe 
subsequently) and we interact them with an indicator for low SES.   
We  consider  two  categories  of  alternatives.    The  first  includes  other  features  of  the 
income and wage distribution. The second includes other social measures that are more directly 
focused on identifying alternative explanations – political composition of the state, a measure of 
religiosity of the state, the percentage of the population that is minority, the incarceration rate, 
poverty rate, and Putnam’s Social Capital Index. We describe all of the alternatives we consider 
in more detail when we report the results of our analysis. 
IV. DATA DESCRIPTION 
  Our empirical analysis takes advantage of cross-state variation in outcomes using five 
waves of data from the National Survey of Family Growth (NSFG) and cross-national variation 
in outcomes using data from the Fertility and Family Surveys (FFS).   
A. NSFG Data 
The NSFG has evolved considerably since its inception in 1973.  Initially, it focused 
exclusively on married women between the ages of 15 and 44.  Beginning with the 1982 survey, 
all women in this age range were included regardless of marital status; we restrict our attention to 
the surveys since then.  The 2002 survey was also the first to include men in this age range, but 
with just two waves of men available and a relatively small sample size for state level analyses, 
these data are insufficient to study their childbearing outcomes for this project.  Also, beginning 
in 2006, the survey changed its design from one that was conducted every six or seven years to 
one that is conducted annually, but with smaller samples in each year.  In the end, we use data Kearney and Levine, p. 14 
from the 1982, 1988, 1995, 2002, and 2006-2008 surveys.  These surveys provide observations 
for over 42,000 women between the ages of 15 and 44.   
In all of our subsequent analysis, we restrict our attention to women who have turned age 
20 (or 25 where appropriate) in 1976 or afterwards.  The age restriction follows naturally from 
our outcome measures that are measured at age 20 or 25.   We impose the year restriction to 
avoid much of the social and behavioral changes that were associated with the introduction and 
diffusion of the birth control pill in the 1960s and abortion legalization in the early 1970s.  After 
imposing these sample restrictions, we still have nearly 27,000 observations in these data. 
  Each  survey  contains  complete  pregnancy  histories,  which  we  can  use  to  generate 
measures of pregnancies and pregnancy resolution (including childbearing) by age 20 (that is, 
through age 19).  One potential problem with these data is the reporting of abortions.  A woman 
who has had an abortion may report it accurately, report it as a miscarriage, or not report the 
pregnancy at all.  For our purposes, we focus on the incidence of “pregnancy failure,” which 
includes either a miscarriage or an abortion.  This measure should capture behavioral changes in 
abortion  regardless  of  how  they  are  reported  as  long  as  the  pregnancy  itself  is  reported.  
Although miscarriages may not be purely biologically determined (Ashcraft and Lang, 2010), we 
believe it is reasonable to assume that the vast majority of movements in pregnancy failures are 
generated from changes in abortion decisions (particularly since fetal deaths are so rare).   
Data  on  age  at  first  marriage  is  also  available  so  that  we  can  ascertain  whether  the 
observed  pregnancies  occurred  before  marriage.    We  can  also  approximate  whether  the 
pregnancy led to a marriage that occurred before the birth of the child.  We define these so-called 
“shotgun marriages” as a birth that follows a marriage by six months or less. Kearney and Levine, p. 15 
  The importance of using microdata for this exercise is that we are able to link fertility 
histories to personal characteristics.  In particular, the hypothesis we test is about the impact of 
inequality on the fertility decisions of those with low socioeconomic status.  It is critical to be 
able to provide an operational definition of low socioeconomic status and identify women who 
satisfy it.  Although ideally we would have access to family income when women were growing 
up, the retrospective nature of the data prohibits that.  Instead, we categorize women according to 
their mother’s level of education, focusing on the children of high school dropouts as the ones 
who  should  be  affected  the  most  when  they  grow  up  in  locations  with  greater  inequality.  
Another important feature of these data is the availability of state identifiers, which enable us to 
make the link to the level of income inequality where the women grew up.
7 
We attach to these outcome measures a set of environmental factors that existed in the 
respondent’s state of residence and the year in which she turned age 19; when we analyze birth 
outcomes by age 25, we attach state-level factors for the year in which a woman turned age 24.  
These factors include the policy variables listed above -- the level of welfare generosity and the 
status of welfare reform, SCHIP implementation, Medicaid family planning expansions, and the 
types of abortion restrictions.  In addition, we attach the state-level unemployment rate in that 
year. We additionally attach alternative characteristics measures that we use in our horse race 
specifications – percentage of votes to Democrats, Index of religiosity, percentage of population 
that is minority, incarceration rate, poverty rate, and Putnam’s Social Capital Index.  
                                                 
7 State identifiers are available in the NSFG for researchers with special permission from the National Center for 
Health Research. We accessed these data on-site at the NCHS Research Data Center in Hyattsville, MD. These state 
identifiers focus on the respondent’s state of residence at the time of the survey, which may be different from their 
state  of  residence  during their  teenage  years.    We  have  to  assume  that  any  interstate  migration related  to  the 
interaction of inequality and socioeconomic status during the intervening years is small.  Kearney and Levine, p. 16 
  Of primary interest, we attach measures of income inequality in the respondent’s state of 
residence.
8  We created these measures using microdata from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses 
along with the 2006-2008 American Community Surveys on household income.  These data are 
available from IPUMS-USA (Ruggles, 2010).  Using these data, we estimated income cut-offs at 
the 10
th and 50
th percentiles for each state and survey year and then generate ratios of these 
measures (i.e. 50/10 ratio) as our indicator of inequality.  We use these data to estimate long-run 
averages in measured inequality within states.   
Table 1 tabulates inequality by state, which varies widely. Interestingly, the fifth highest 
inequality state by this measure is Massachusetts with a 50/10 ratio of 4.6 and the fifth lowest 
inequality state is its neighbor, Vermont, with a 50/10 ratio of 3.6.  This suggests that as a rough 
gauge, moving from a low inequality state to a high inequality state increases the 50/10 ratio by 
around 1.  We will use this number in interpreting our results.   
Figures 5 and 6 present some descriptive statistics from the NSFG data that provide some 
useful background for interpreting our subsequent analysis.  In Figure 5, we present trends in 
rates of childbearing by age 20 for all women and by marital status at the time of first birth.  This 
figure shows that the rate of early childbearing has fluctuated around a level of about 20 percent 
since the mid-1970s.  The most recent trend is downward; of those who turned age 20 in 2006 
around 17 percent had already given birth.  This relative stability masks dramatic differences in 
                                                 
8 We have considered whether the state is the right level of aggregation for this analysis.  On the one hand, teens 
may have a better perspective on the economic well-being of those more immediately around her.  On the other, the 
broader environment may better capture for her what her available opportunities are.  Data issues also hinder our 
ability to conduct an analysis at local levels.  First, our geographic identifier in the NSFG is the location of current 
residence and mobility is a much greater concern at the local level than at a broader level.  Second, the only sub-
state identifier available even in restricted NSFG data is the county  of residence.  This limits the sample size 
available for our analysis because public use census data only identifies county of residence for 40 percent of the 
population.  Nevertheless, we have conducted a county-level analysis identical in form to that reported here using 
the subset of NSFG respondents who live in counties for which Census income data are available.  The results are 
qualitatively similar than those reported here, but smaller in size.  Rather than a coefficient of 0.053 (0.015) in 
Column 1 of Table 3, the comparable coefficient with county data is 0.031 (0.012).  This is consistent with the 
attenuation bias that would result from cross-county migration. 
 Kearney and Levine, p. 17 
marital versus non-marital early childbearing.  The percentage of women who had a marital birth 
by age 20 fell from 14 percent to 3 percent over this period.  The comparable statistic for non-
marital  births rose  from 8 percent to 14 percent.  Understanding these patterns (including  a 
discussion  of  whether  a  decline  in  shotgun  marriages  is  responsible)  is  clearly  important  in 
understanding the trends in early childbearing. 
In Figure 6, we focus on the outcomes for unmarried women who were pregnant before 
the age of 20.  The most notable feature of this figure is the dramatic increase in the percentage 
of women who go on to carry their pregnancy to term.  Although this outcome occurred only 
about 40 percent of the time in the mid-1970s, it now occurs nearly two-thirds of the time.  This 
increase can be attributed partly to a reduction in the fraction of non-marital conceptions that 
result in a marital birth (i.e. shotgun marriage).  Since around 1980, however, a reduction in the 
percentage of pregnancy failures, likely the result of less frequent use of abortion, is another 
contributing factor.  In the most recent statistics, a woman who gets pregnant outside of marriage 
has a 62 percent probability of having a non-marital birth, a 10 percent probability of getting 
married before the birth, and a 28 percent probability of aborting or having a miscarriage. 
B. FFS Data 
The Family and Fertility Survey is a dataset that combines survey data from 23 countries 
mainly in Western and Eastern Europe (along with a few other developed countries) conducted 
largely  during  the  early  and  mid-1990s.    A  standard  questionnaire  was  prepared  that  asked 
respondents  to  report  characteristics  of  their  household,  parents,  partnerships,  and  children, 
among other things.  Importantly each survey also contains complete fertility histories for each 
respondent.  The survey was given to national representative samples of women (and men in Kearney and Levine, p. 18 
many countries) of childbearing age.  Although a standard questionnaire existed, modifications 
were imposed in many countries so that the data available is not necessarily uniform.  
For our purposes, we restricted our attention to those countries outside of Eastern Europe.  
Women’s fertility histories are the focus of our analysis and childbearing outcomes for women in 
these FFS countries mostly took place prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Because of the 
vastly different economic environment that existed in those countries during that period, we did 
not include them in our analysis.  The remaining countries include Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, and the United 
States.
9  The United States data actually is the 1995 National Survey of Family Growth.  In much 
of our reported results, we exclude the United States because it is such an outlier among this 
group of countries in terms of both its level of inequality and the level of early childbearing.  As 
in the NSFG, and for similar reasons, we restrict our attention to those women who were older 
than 20 or 25 (depending on the age at which outcomes are measured) on the survey date and 
who  turned  those  ages  no  earlier  than  1976.    That  date  pushes  most  childbearing  outcomes 
beyond the introduction and diffusion of the birth control pill and, in many (but not all) countries 
past the legalization of abortion.
10   
Unlike our analysis of NSFG data, we do not distinguish fertility outcomes between those 
that  take  place  within  and  outside  the  scope  of  marriage.    The  reason  for  this  is  that  the 
relationship between marriage and fertility in many European countries is considerably weaker 
than it is in the United States; it is not uncommon for committed partners to have children before 
marriage  and  then  marry  sometime  later  (cf.  Kiernan,  2004).  As  such,  the  link  between 
                                                 
9 Obtaining data from the Netherlands requires a separate application procedure, which we have yet to complete. 
10 In our regression models using these data we also include measures of the legal status of abortion in each country 
in each year.  The data necessary to code this variable are available in Levine (2004). Kearney and Levine, p. 19 
subsequent  well-being  and  whether  marriage  preceded  a  birth  is  weaker,  so  we  do  not  use 
marriage to distinguish between outcomes. 
To measure a woman’s socioeconomic status, we use an indicator of whether a woman 
grew up in a household (“most of the time”) with both of her parents as opposed to a single 
parent or no parent household.  This variable is not available in each country and further restricts 
the data available to us.  In the end, we are  left with  Austria,  Belgium,  Finland, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain as the countries available for our analysis of fertility.  When 
we focus on conception and pregnancy failure, we are further restricted because the surveys in 
Austria and Germany do not ask about these outcomes, so we are left with data for six countries. 
The main additional variable that we attach to these data is the Gini coefficient as our 
inequality measure that we also calculate as the long-term average within each country.  We use 
the Gini coefficient here rather than the 50/10 ratio because its use in international inequality 
statistics is more prevalent.  We take advantage of the data collection efforts conducted by the 
United Nations World Institute for Development Economics Research (UN-WIDER), which has 
cataloged an expansive collection of Gini coefficient estimates for a large number of countries in 
its  World Income Inequality Database.
11  We restrict our attention to all available  estimates 
between 1976 and 2000, focusing on those that are: (a) obtained from nationally representative 
data sources; (b) deemed to be of high quality; (c) cover the entire population of the country; (d) 
use individuals as the unit of analysis, and; (e) focus on disposable income.  Imposing these 
restrictions still leaves at least six estimates of the Gini coefficient within each country.
12  We 
take  the  simple  average  of  these  within-country  estimates  to  obtain  our  desired  long-term 
                                                 
11  We  obtained  these  data  from http://www.wider.unu.edu/research/Database/en_GB/database/  (accessed  June  7, 
2011) 
12 For Finland, we have 40 estimates of the Gini coefficient over the 25 years because multiple data sources are 
available for the same year. Kearney and Levine, p. 20 
measure of inequality.  Along with the Gini coefficient, we also attach national unemployment 
rates for each country and year along with indicators for the legal status of abortion. 
Figure 7 displays trends in conceptions, births, and pregnancy failures in the countries 
with complete data on all of these outcomes over time.  It shows that the percentage of women 
giving birth by age 20 fell in these countries from about 14 percent to 10 or 11 percent for birth 
cohorts hitting age 20 in 1976 through 1989 (using this cut-off to maintain the same countries in 
the panel throughout the period).  These rates are at least 50 percent lower than that observed in 
the United States, as reported in Figure 5.  Rates of conception have fallen as well, particularly 
throughout the 1980s, which  is consistent with the drop off  in the rate of pregnancy  failure 
during this period.  Since changes over time in pregnancy failures are largely attributable to 
changes in the rate of abortion, the declining occurrence of abortion during this period in Europe 
matches that occurring in the United States at that time. 
Table 2 characterizes the degree of income inequality in all of the FFS countries used in 
this analysis (including those with missing pregnancy resolution data).  It shows a great deal of 
dispersion in inequality, as captured by the Gini coefficient.  As a rough characterization, low 
inequality countries have a Gini coefficient around .25, middle inequality is characterized by a 
Gini of around .3 and high inequality is captured by a Gini of around .35.  Although not listed 
here, the estimate of .38 in the United States is higher than any of these other countries.  The 
spread of around .1 is a useful reference point for subsequent interpretation of the magnitude of 
our regression results later in the paper. 
V. RESULTS 
A.  Analysis of NSFG Data Kearney and Levine, p. 21 
  Before presenting our formal econometric results, we begin by presenting a descriptive 
analysis of the NSFG data that is comparable in spirit to our regression models that can illustrate 
the  findings  to  come.    To  do  so,  we  distinguish  states  by  their  long-term  level  of  income 
inequality (50/10 ratio). As listed in Table 1, we categorize states by quartile, focusing on the top 
and  bottom  quartiles  along  with  the  interquartile  range  for  each  of  these  income  measures, 
respectively, giving us three categories: high, medium, and low inequality. Then, we distinguish 
women by their mother’s level of education and estimate a set of outcomes for women separately 
by socioeconomic status (as proxied for by her mother’s education group) and state inequality 
category (high/medium/low). A comparison of outcomes across states and SES groups represents 
a  stylized  version  of  the  interaction  of  SES  and  state  inequality  measures,  previewing  the 
regressions to follow. 
  Figures 8A through 8D present the results of this exercise. Figure 8A focuses on non-
marital childbearing by age 20.  It shows that high SES women (with college-educated mothers) 
exhibit little variation in early non-marital childbearing across states that differ in their level of 
income inequality.  Low SES women (with mothers who have dropped out of high school) are 
more likely to give birth to a child at a young age outside of marriage if they live in a high 
inequality state.  Moving from a low inequality state to a high inequality state (which represents 
roughly  a  one  point  increase  in  the  50/10  ratio)  appears  to  increase  the  rate  of  non-marital 
childbearing by age 20 by around 5 percentage points.   
Figures 8B through 8D are designed to determine the antecedent behavior that leads to 
this increase in non-marital childbearing among low SES women.  In Figure 8B we see little 
evidence that high inequality changes rates of non-marital conceptions differentially for women 
who differ by SES.  Figure 8C displays rates of pregnancy failure that does show a pattern of Kearney and Levine, p. 22 
behavior across states and groups of women that is consistent with the pattern in non-marital 
childbearing.  Middle and high SES women have no clear pattern in their rates of  pregnancy 
failure, but the pattern for low SES women is clear.  Rates of pregnancy failure are a little over 4 
percentage points lower for these women when they reside in high inequality states compared to 
low  inequality states.  This  means that the differences  in  early  non-marital  childbearing can 
almost entirely be attributed to differences in the rate of pregnancy failure, which is likely due to 
differences in the use of abortion.  Figure 8D focuses on rates of shotgun marriage; no apparent 
pattern is observed across groups here. 
These charts represent a stylized version of the regressions reported in Table 3, which 
reports estimates from our econometric model described earlier.  The first column in the upper 
panel  of  this  table  explores  non-marital  births  by  age  20  as  the  outcome.    The  interaction 
between  the  50/10  ratio  and  having  a  high  school  dropout  mother  represents  β1  in  our 
econometric model.  It indicates that low SES mothers in a high inequality state are more likely 
to have a non-marital birth by age 20.  As we saw earlier, a one point change in the 50/10 ratio 
roughly captures the movement from a low inequality state to a high inequality state.  In this 
case, that movement is predicted to increase early, non-marital childbearing by 5.3 percentage 
points for those women whose mothers were high school dropouts.  This point estimate is very 
similar to what we observed in Figure 8A, suggesting that the other covariates in the model have 
very little correlation with inequality and/or early non-marital childbearing. 
The remainder of the top panel of the table focuses on other non-marital outcomes and all 
marital outcomes by age 20.  In Column 3, we see that much of the reason why non-marital 
childbearing among low SES women rises with inequality is that abortion rates, as captured by 
pregnancy  failures,  fall.    The  magnitude  of  this  estimate  indicates  that  moving  from  a  low Kearney and Levine, p. 23 
inequality state to a high inequality state reduces the likelihood of a pregnancy failure by 4.2 
percentage points.  We cannot statistically distinguish this estimate from the 5.3 percentage point 
increase in early non-marital childbearing.  This suggests that the rise in early non-marital births 
associated with greater inequality is mainly attributable to fewer abortions.  Column 2 provides 
no evidence that the likelihood of contraception is affected.  We find little support for an impact 
of inequality on marital fertility.  In Column 7, we focus on shotgun marriage as an outcome and 
find no statistically significant impact of inequality there for low SES women. 
Interestingly, when we focus on moderate SES women as captured by daughters of high 
school  graduates,  we  find  that  the  point  estimate  for  the  increase  in  non-marital  births  is 
attenuated, and now there is a statistically significant reduction in marital births, of nearly the 
same (opposite-signed) magnitude. Presumably these women are at some, albeit reduced, risk of 
poor economic outcomes that may be exaggerated in high inequality states.  For them, greater 
inequality is associated with fewer marital births.  This suggests that a reduced prevalence of 
shotgun marriage is the pathway, as confirmed in Column 7. These results are similar to the 
results for women in their young 20s, described below.  
The  lower  panel  of  Table  3  replicates  this  analysis,  focusing  on  childbearing/marital 
outcomes by age 25 rather than age 20.  Including somewhat older young adults increases the 
relevance  of  shotgun  marriages  in  these  findings.    We  continue  to  find  that  non-marital 
childbearing increases for low SES women when they live in high inequality states, but we find a 
similar drop in marital childbearing (although the latter is not quite significant).  Changes in the 
likelihood of a shotgun marriage explain the divergent pattern.
13   
                                                 
13 We have estimated these models separately for blacks and Hispanics, but sample sizes drop substantially and 
statistical power falls as a result. For the outcomes by age 20, among the sample of Hispanic women (n=4,086), the 
estimated coefficient (standard error) on the interaction term of interest is 0.060 (.047) for non-marital births, 0.020 
(0.050) for non-marital pregnancy failure, and -0.065 (.024) for shot-gun married. These results suggest that low-Kearney and Levine, p. 24 
B.  Analysis of FFS Data 
  Our conceptual approach in analyzing the FFS data is very similar to that using the NSFG 
with  a  few  minor  distinctions.    First,  our  measure  of  socioeconomic  status  is  household 
composition  during  childhood  rather  than  maternal  education.    Low  SES  is  determined  by 
whether a woman grew up in a household headed by a single or no parent.  Second, we also rely 
on a country’s long-term average Gini coefficient rather than the 50/10 ratio.  Third, we no 
longer make distinctions between marital and non-marital outcomes because this difference has 
less significance in the European context. 
  As in our discussion of the NSFG results, we begin by presenting in Figure 9 a graphical 
depiction of the difference in the likelihood of giving birth by age 20 by socioeconomic status in 
countries that differ  by their  level of  inequality.  Countries are distinguished  into  inequality 
categories consistent with the statistics reported in Table 2.  Among women who grew up in 
higher SES households (i.e. with both parents), we see perhaps a trivially small increase in rates 
of early childbearing among women growing up in higher inequality countries.  For women from 
low  SES  households,  however,  a  clear  pattern  is  evident  that  women  from  high  inequality 
countries are considerably more likely to give birth by age 20.  Moving from a low inequality 
country to a high inequality country increases the odds of having an early birth by around 5 
percentage points.  Notably, the magnitude of this effect is very similar to that obtained in the 
U.S. in moving between a low inequality and high inequality state. 
                                                                                                                                                       
SES Hispanic teens living in more unequal places are less likely to get married conditional on getting pregnant. For 
the outcomes by age 20, among the sample of black women (n=6,117), the estimated coefficient (standard error) on 
the interaction term of interest is 0.025 (.033) for non-marital births,-0.085 (.025) for non-marital pregnancy failure, 
and 0.018 (.014) for shot-gun married. These results suggest that low-SES black teens living in more unequal places 
are less likely to terminate a pregnancy, conditional on getting pregnant. The pattern of results  is qualitatively 
similar for these racial/ethnic groups for outcomes by age 25. Kearney and Levine, p. 25 
  These  stylized results are replicated  in a  more  formal econometric analysis, which  is 
reported in Table 4.  It reports the results of our econometric model, specified earlier, where β1 is 
captured by the interaction between the Gini coefficient and whether a woman was not raised in 
a two parent household.  The top panel considers fertility outcomes by age 20 and the bottom 
panel by age 25.  In interpreting our findings, we focus on the impact of a 0.1 point increase in 
the Gini coefficient, which roughly reflects a movement from a low inequality country to a high 
inequality country, as described earlier.   
Consistent  with  Figure  9,  the  results  in  the  top  panel  indicate  a  strong  relationship 
between inequality and early childbearing among low SES women.  In Column 1, we present 
regression results in models that include the United States.  In that model, we see that a 0.1 point 
increase in the Gini coefficient increases the rate of childbearing among low SES women by age 
20 by 5.9 percentage points.
14  In Column 2 we drop the United States from the analysis and this 
estimated impact falls to 3 percentage points.  Again, this is consistent with the U.S. being a 
positive outlier in both inequality and early childbearing along with low rates of two parent 
families.    This  estimate  falls  again,  to  2  percentage  points,  when  we  restrict  our  sample  in 
Column 3 to the remaining countries that also report data on other pregnancy outcomes.  When 
we focus on conceptions and pregnancy failures in Columns 4 and 5, respectively, we see that 
higher inequality generates both more conceptions and fewer pregnancy failures among low SES 
women by age 20.  The importance of conceptions is somewhat different than in the United 
States, where abortion was the primary determinant.   
                                                 
14 Standard errors reported in Table 4 are clustered at the country level.  As reported in Cameron, Miller, and 
Gelbach (2008), even these adjusted standard errors may be understated with so few countries used in the analysis 
(9, 8, and 6, respectively, in columns 1, 2, and 3 through 5).  A simple solution to help address the problem that they 
describe,  which has  been  implemented  in  Cohen  and  Dupas  (2010),  is  to  adjust  the  critical  values  using  a  t-
distribution with G-2 degrees of freedom, where G is the number of countries.  Implementing this approach would 
change the standard critical value of 1.96 at the 5 percent level of significance from a normal distribution to 2.262, 
2.306, and 2.447, respectively, from t-distributions. Kearney and Levine, p. 26 
The bottom panel of the table focuses on outcomes by age 25.  The impact on births is 
similar to that by age 20, albeit somewhat less precisely estimated.   On the other hand, the point 
estimates in models of conception and pregnancy failure suggest that abortion is a less common 
mechanism than it is for younger women.  The precision of these results,  however, is weak 
enough to prevent us from drawing strong conclusions here.   
C. An Investigation of Alternative Mechanisms 
  Our  approach  to  statistical  identification  focuses  on  the  interaction  between 
socioeconomic status and a measure of income inequality.  That inequality measure is estimated 
as a long-term average and fixed within states/countries over time.  As such, any state/country 
fixed factor that is highly correlated with the measure of inequality that we use will generate 
results that are similar in spirit to those reported here.  Low SES women in states or countries 
with that characteristic will be found to have a higher propensity to give birth at an early age.  In 
other words, our interpretation of the role played by inequality may not be warranted if there is 
some  other  important  state/country  fixed  factor that  is  omitted,  but  strongly  correlated  with 
inequality and directly related to childbearing outcomes for low SES women. 
Although we do not have a perfect solution to rule out this possibility, we are able to 
examine  the  impact  of  including  other  plausible  alternatives  into  our  model.    If  including 
interactions  between  SES  and  these  other  factors  reduces  the  magnitude  of  the  inequality 
interaction, then this would  indicate the presence of omitted  variable  bias.   If  not, it would 
bolster our argument that the relationship between inequality and early childbearing is causal.   
In our analysis, we focus on data from the NSFG and the relationship between early (by 
age  20)  non-marital  childbearing  and  other  state  characteristics  interacted  with  low 
socioeconomic status.  Our emphasis on the NSFG data, as opposed to the FFS, and alternative Kearney and Levine, p. 27 
state characteristics is more a function of data availability and our ability to generate plausible 
alternatives than any other substantive consideration.  
We consider two sets of alternative factors. The first consists of other features of state 
income and wage distributions that may matter, but are different than our measure of inequality 
at the bottom of the income distribution. We consider five alternatives.  First, we include the 
90/50  ratio  from  the  income  distribution,  calculated  in  the  same  way  we  described  earlier 
regarding the 50/10 ratio.  Since that measure identifies inequality at the top of the distribution 
rather than the bottom, we would not expect it to have a very strong impact on early childbearing 
among low SES women.  Second (and third), we consider the absolute level of income at the 
bottom and middle of the income distribution, as opposed to the relative distance between these 
measures. Perhaps it is not inequality that matters for a young woman’s decision, but rather how 
low the 10
th percentile of the income distribution is, or where the 50
th percentile is. Fourth (and 
fifth),  we  consider  the  average  wage  ratio  for  high  school  graduates  relative  to  high  school 
dropouts and for college graduates relative to high school graduates.  These outcomes provide a 
measure of the returns to education in the state and provide a way to examine whether a higher 
return  to  moving  up  the  ladder  can  actually  reduce  the  likelihood  of  early,  non-marital 
childbearing among low SES women.
15 
In Table 5, we report the results of estimating equation [2] including these five alternative 
measures. Column (1) reports the main coefficients of interest from equation [1] – namely, a 
point estimate of 0.053 (.015) on the interaction of the 50/10 ratio and our maternal education 
measure of low-SES status. As we show in the remainder of the table, the coefficients on each of 
                                                 
15 We calculated these wage ratios using data the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses along with the 2006-2008 ACS, 
estimating  hourly  wages  for  full-time  workers  (greater  than  1,500  hours  in  the  year)  by  level  of  educational 
attainment. Kearney and Levine, p. 28 
these alternative measures is not statistically significant (at the 5 percent level) and including 
these additional variables, does not attenuate the coefficient on our main variable of interest.  
We  next  consider  a  set  of  six  alternative  state  characteristics  that  are  unrelated  to 
economic outcomes, but capture other dimensions of the political and social climate within a 
state.    We  first  consider  the  political  culture  of  a  state,  which  we  capture  by  including  the 
average percentage of voters favoring Democratic candidates averaged within state between the 
1972 and 2008 Presidential elections.
16  Religious beliefs in a state may also be a contributing 
factor; we experiment with including an index of religiosity as well.
17 We also explore the role 
played  by  differences  in  states’  percentage  of  the  population  that  is  minority  (defined  as 
individuals who are not white, non-Hispanic).  Next, we include the incarceration rate and the 
poverty rate in the state.
18 The final alternative state characteristic is “social capital.” Putnam 
(2000) argues that the loss of social capital has contributed to the high teen birth rate, so we 
include his measure of social capital as a potential alternative. 
The results of this analysis are reported in Table 6. Again, the first column replicates the 
first column of Table 3 for the purposes of comparison.  The results provide no evidence that any 
of these additional measures has an effect on early non-marital childbearing rates among low-
SES women. Nor does the inclusion of these variables alter our conclusion about the role of 
                                                 
16 The source of these data is David Leip’s  Atlas of Presidential Elections, available at http://uselectionatlas.org/. 
17 The source of these data is Gallup Poll, State of the States: Importance of Religion.  January 28
th, 2009.  Available 
at:   http://www.gallup.com/poll/114022/state-states-importance-religion.aspx. 
18  The  incarceration  data  are  compiled  by  the  U.S.  Bureau  of  Justice  Statistics,  Office  of  Justice  programs, 
downloaded  from  www.ojp.usdoj.gov  (accessed  April,  2011).    Poverty  rate  data  comes  from  the  United  States 
Census  Bureau  and  were  obtained  from  http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html 
(accessed June 7, 2011).  In our analysis, we follow the Census Bureau recommendation to use data beginning in 
1980 to maintain the consistency of the data over the time period. Kearney and Levine, p. 29 
inequality.
19 The bulk of the evidence in Tables 5 and 6 is strongly suggestive that inequality has 
a causal impact on early non-marital childbearing in the United States.   
D. Evaluating the Magnitude of the Effects 
An important motivation for this current project is the inability of past research to explain 
much of the geographic variation that exists in teen childbearing.  Our analysis suggests income 
inequality may be an important determinant. The proposed mechanism for the relationship is that 
greater levels of income inequality lead to a heightened sense of economic despair. We formalize 
this idea in a model below. Although we can by no means explain all of the variability or even 
the majority of it, our results are able to explain a sizeable share of the problem.  In the United 
States,  according  to  our  estimates  13.6  percent  of  women  experienced  a  teen,  non-marital 
childbirth in high inequality states compared to 10.1 percent of women in low inequality states 
over the post-1976 sample window we consider.  In those high inequality states, roughly 34 
percent of teens were daughters of high school dropout mothers (per our tabulations of the NSFG 
data).  Based on our estimates in Table 3, low SES women in high inequality states were 5.3 
percentage points more likely to have a non-marital teen birth compared to low SES women in 
low inequality states.  If the level of inequality in the high inequality states decreased to the level 
of  the  low  inequality  states,  we  would  expect  teen,  non-marital  childbearing  to  decline  by 
.053*.34*1 = .018 or 1.8 percentage points.  This represents 1.8/(13.7-10.2) = .51 or 51 percent 
of the gap in the likelihood of non-marital childbearing by teens between high and low inequality 
states.    In  other  words,  equalizing  rates  of  income  inequality  across  states  would  eliminate 
around half of the difference in rates of early, non-marital childbearing between high and low 
inequality states.   
                                                 
19 One possible  exception to this general finding is that including our political measure has a somewhat more 
substantial downward impact on the key interaction between the 50/10 ratio and our measure of low-SES in the 
model for non-marital childbearing by age 25.  Kearney and Levine, p. 30 
  We also conduct a similar calculation using the results of our analysis of FFS data, with 
the goal of applying international estimates to explain the gap in teen fertility between the United 
States and Europe.  Focusing exclusively on the data in the FFS, we estimate that 20.1 percent of 
women give birth before the age of 20 in the United States and 9.2 percent of women in non-
Eastern Bloc countries had a teen birth, generating a 10.9 percentage point difference between 
the  U.S.  and  the  other  countries.    In  the  United  States,  15  percent  of  women  grew  up  in 
households headed by a single or no parent.  Our estimates in Table 4 that include the U.S. 
(Column 1) indicate that a one point increase in the Gini coefficient would reduce the likelihood 
of a birth by age 20 among low SES women by 0.589 percentage points.  This means that if 
those 15 percent of women grew up  in two parent families and with the  level of  inequality 
observed in a low inequality country with a Gini coefficient of 0.25 instead of the 0.38 value that 
exists in the U.S., teen fertility in the U.S. would decline by 0.15*(0.25 - 0.38)*0.589 = -0.011.  
This represents -0.011/0.109 = -0.101, or a 10.1 percent reduction in the gap in teen fertility 
between the United States and the other countries.   
   Our estimates suggest that inequality can explain roughly 10 percent of the variation in 
teen childbearing across countries and 50 percent across U.S. states; however, we suspect that 
our estimated figure for the cross-state variation is an overestimate and the figure for cross-
country variation is an underestimate of the role played by inequality. First, our measure of low-
SES status in the cross-country FFS data captures only 15 percent of the population, as compared 
to our measure of low-SES in the U.S. context, which captures 35 percent of the population. In 
the FFS, we are probably applying our estimated effect to too small a percent, thereby leading to 
an artificially low estimate of 10 percent of the gap being explainable by inequality. In addition, 
the difference in teen birth rates between high and low inequality states is 3 percentage points, as Kearney and Levine, p. 31 
compared to a 10 percentage point difference between high and low inequality countries. In other 
words, as a mechanical matter, the denominator of the difference is substantially lower in the 
cross-state context. Recall from Figures 3 and 4 that the cross-sectional link between inequality 
and early childbearing is much stronger internationally than across states. Thus, the set of high 
inequality  states  are  a  much  more  diverse  set  of  states  than  are  the  set  of  high  inequality 
countries. This likely suggests that our 50 percent estimate overstates the amount of cross-state 
variation  that  can  be  explained  by  inequality.  We  thus  conclude  that  inequality  can  explain 
between 10 and 50 percent of the geographic variation in teen fertility. 
VI. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE “CULTURE OF DESPAIR”  
  To  this  point,  we  have  empirically  addressed  the  role  of  inequality  in  explaining 
geographic  variation  in  early,  non-marital  childbearing,  but  we  have  not  addressed  why 
inequality might matter. Although we do not presume to have a concrete answer to this question, 
we propose an economic model incorporating insights from the sociological and ethnographic 
literatures that we described earlier. One of the main contributions of this paper is to show how 
these  ideas are easily captured in a  fairly  standard economics  model of  individual decision-
making. The model we propose is based on the idea that young girls make decisions about their 
behaviors – sexual activity, contraceptive use, abortion – based in part on their own perceptions 
of their likelihood of future success. The primary role of inequality in this model is to affect 
one’s perception of economic success. 
  In  this  model,  a  young,  unmarried  woman's  decision  to  have  a  baby  is  based  on  a 
comparison of her expected lifetime utility if she has a baby in the current period compared to 
expected lifetime utility if she delays childbearing. An individual chooses to have a baby in the 
current period if the following condition is met: Kearney and Levine, p. 32 
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where 
b
o u  is current period utility if she has a baby and  0
d u is current period utility if she delays 
childbearing.  V is the present discounted sum of future period utility.  
  For young, unmarried women, childbearing has a direct effect on current period utility and 
an indirect effect on future period utility.  We propose that for young, unmarried women of low 
socioeconomic status (SES) having a baby is utility-enhancing in the current period, such that u
b 
> u
d. This proposition reflects the description from Edin and Kefalas (2005) above, whereby a 
baby is seen as bringing “purpose, the validation, the companionship, and the order” otherwise 
missing from many of these women’s lives. If u
b < u
d, it is never optimal to have a baby in the 
current  period  and  the  model  trivially  predicts  “delay”  to  the  optimizing  choice.  It  seems 
reasonable to expect that for the majority of high-SES young women, u
b < u
d, and the results of 
the empirical analysis are consistent with that supposition. 
  For  unmarried  young  women,  having  a  baby  in  the  current  period  negatively  affects 
expected future utility by leading to lower levels of consumption in the future. For simplicity, we 
characterize utility in future periods as taking high and low values, U
high and U
low, respectively.  
We assume that childbearing at an early age reduces the likelihood of achieving U
high. There are 
two likely mechanisms, the first through the labor market and the second through the marriage 
market. With regard to the first, we posit that having a baby makes it more difficult for women to 
acquire  human  capital,  decreasing  the  future  stream  of  own  earnings,  and  thereby  lowering 
subsequent income and consumption. Having a baby while young and unmarried is also likely to 
be a hindrance in the marriage market, and would thereby reduce the likelihood of improving 
one’s economic condition through a successful marriage. We define U
low to be the level achieved 
by a young woman who does not delay childbearing. The present discounted value of the young Kearney and Levine, p. 33 
mother’s future utility stream is thus deterministic and captured by V
low.  If the young woman 
delays childbearing, there is some positive probability p that she will achieve the “high” utility 
position in future periods. As we have defined things, a young woman who has a baby in the 
current period is necessarily assigned to a low position in the income distribution. Our model 
assumes  that  if  she  delays  childbearing,  she  has  some  probability  of  achieving  the  high 
income/consumption level.
20 
  We can therefore write the condition to have a baby in the current period as follows:  
 
(1 ) . high b low d low u V u pV p V
oo
        [4] 
This condition makes it clear that the change in lifetime utility from delayed childbearing comes 
from two opposite-signed sources: (1) the loss of current period enjoyment of a baby and (2) a 
positive probability of achieving the high- utility state in the future. We have implicitly assumed 
that the delay in childbearing causes no first-order change in the future lifetime enjoyment of the 
child itself (say, by making childlessness a more likely outcome).  In other words, the decision 
we are modeling is to have a baby in the current period versus having a baby in the subsequent 
period. So the direct utility loss from not having a child in the current period is limited to the loss 
in current period utility.  
  Rearranging terms, we see that a young woman will choose to delay childbearing in the 
current period if and only if:   
    (1 ) high low low b d pV p V V u u
oo
       [5] 
Of course, the young woman does not perfectly observe p. Instead, she bases her decision on her 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, we could define “low” and “high” utility as relative constructs that need not correspond to low and 
high levels in the unconditional income distribution. Defining the positions in the simplest case as corresponding to 
“low” and “high” positions in the overall income distribution leads the model to have an ambiguous prediction on 
the relationship between inequality and early non-marital childbearing, as we show below. It is thus a conservative 
modeling approach, given our main hypothesis.  Kearney and Levine, p. 34 
perception of p. Let us call this subjective probability q, and rewrite the condition for delaying 
childbearing: 
    (1 ) high low low b d qV q V V u u
oo
       [6] 
If a young woman perceives that she has a sizable chance at achieving economic success -- and 
thereby capturing V
high -- by delaying childbearing, the comparison is more likely to favor the 
choice  “delay.”  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  young  woman  perceives  that  even  if  she  delays 
childbearing her chances of economic success are sufficiently unlikely -- in other words, if q is 
very low -- then the comparison is more likely to favor having a baby in the current period.
21 
  Rearranging expression [6], we can define a reservation subjective probability q
r such that 












  [7] 
We propose that one's perception of the likelihood of economic success, q, depends on (a) her 







  We additionally propose that one’s perceived probability of success is a function of the 





 .  The further 
                                                 
21 We are not the first to hypothesize that a notion of opportunity costs is an important determinant of the decision to 
have a teen birth (for example, this general idea is contained in Lundberg and Plotnick (1995). However, we are not 
aware of previous work focused on the perception of future economic success and how inequality potentially shapes 
that perception.  
22 This supposition finds empirical support in tabulations of data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY79). That survey includes questions about expectations of future success and perceived control over 
one’s life, as captured by the Rotter Scale Index. We tabulate these variables by maternal education, which we use 
as our proxy for SES status (as described below).  Among  young women whose mothers attended college, 32 
percent report a high likelihood of achieving her occupational aspirations; this compares to only 18 percent of young 
women whose mothers are high school dropouts were optimistic.  Similarly, on the Rotter Scale of control over 
one's life (which ranges from 0 for total control to 16 for no control), the average values for daughters of mothers 
who attended college was 8.01 compared to 9.24 for daughters of high school dropouts. Kearney and Levine, p. 35 
down in the income distribution one finds herself and the more inequality that exists, the lower is 
the  perception  of  economic  success  q.  Note  that  if  income  inequality  and  mobility  were 
positively related, inequality would likely not have such an impact on individual’s perceptions. 
We do not have sufficient data on  mobility differences across  states or countries to include 
mobility in our models directly, but we offer some evidence in Figure 10 indicating that mobility 
and inequality are actually negatively related empirically.  This figure plots the intergenerational 
earnings elasticity – which is inversely related to intergenerational mobility – against the Gini 
coefficient for a set of nine countries.
23 The two variables are strongly positively related, which 
indicates  a  strong  negative  correlation  between  mobility  and  inequality.  To  the  extent  that 
individuals  at  the  bottom  of  the  income  distribution  perceive  a  sizeable  degree  of  income 
inequality and a low degree of mobility, they are likely to have a lower subjective q¸ and a higher 
likelihood of early childbearing. 
  We have described the decision facing a young woman as primarily being about giving 
birth. But as considered in the empirical section, there are multiple decision nodes that lead to a 
non-marital  birth:  getting  pregnant,  carrying  the  pregnancy  to term,  and  not  marrying  one’s 
partner in a so-called “shot gun marriage.” This last pathway explicitly raises the possibility that 
a woman’s decision is influenced not only by her perceived likelihood of her own economic 
advancement,  but  also  the  likelihood  that  marrying  her  partner  will  bring  economic  success 
through  his  economic  achievements.  Assuming  assortative  mating,  it  is  easy  to  see  that 
conditions that lead a young woman to adjust downward her subjective probability of her own 
economic success will also lead her to have a relatively low subjective probability associated 
with the  likelihood that her  male partner will achieve  economic success. So, the greater the 
inequality (and lower the mobility), the lower would be the perceived likelihood that a male 
                                                 
23 A similar figure appears in Wilkinson and Pickett (2009). Kearney and Levine, p. 36 
partner will bring economic advantages.  The results presented in Tables 3 and 4 with regard to 
shot-gun marriage are consistent with this prediction. 
   The prediction with regard to inequality is not unambiguously signed within the model. 
Expression [7] shows that q
r varies inversely with the distance between V
high and V
low, which in 
the most simple case, may be thought of as inequality. In fact, one could interpret this difference 
as a greater return to effort.
24  If so, then greater inequality would lower reservation q, and might 
thereby  lead to less early childbearing.
25 As a result, the theoretical prediction of the  model 
regarding inequality is ambiguous. However, our empirical results suggest that the relationship 
between  inequality  and childbearing  for  low SES women  is,  in  fact, positive. The empirical 
results are consistent with the idea that on net, inequality generates desperation, not aspiration, 
among those at the bottom of the distribution. 
  One important element in this model is that future utility is appropriately discounted. The 
model does  not require any present-biased decision  making, also known  as quasi-hyberbolic 
discounting, to explain the choice that favors current period utility. If we add present-biased 
decision making to the model, it would simply amplify the effect of a lower q and make the 
decision lean even more heavily in favor of having a baby in the current period. 
  This last pathway explicitly raises the possibility that a woman’s decision is influenced not 
only by her perceived likelihood of her own economic advancement, but also the likelihood that 
marrying her partner will bring economic success through his economic achievements. Assuming 
assortative mating, it is easy to see that conditions that lead a young woman to adjust downward 
her subjective probability of her own economic success will also lead her to have a relatively low 
                                                 
24 We loosely tested this proposition earlier by exploring the impact of changes in the college/high school wage 
premium. 
25  This need not be the case if we define V
high to be the “high” level of income/consumption available to the young 
woman making the choice to delay childbearing, and allow for that upper bound to be distinct from a high position 
in the unconditional income distribution. Kearney and Levine, p. 37 
subjective probability associated with the likelihood that her male partner will achieve economic 
success. So, the greater the inequality (and lower the mobility), the lower would be the perceived 
likelihood that a male partner will bring economic advantages.  The results presented in Tables 3 
and 4 with regard to shot-gun marriage are consistent with this prediction. 
  The value of this model is a framework within which to interpret the behavioral factors that 
drive  the  empirical  results.  Inequality  appears  to  be  positively  related  to  early  non-marital 
childbearing  among  low-SES  women.  There  are  a  number  of  proximate  ways  this  could  be 
realized, but the data show that this difference is driven by a greater tendency to “keep the baby” 
among low-SES girls in more unequal places. Note that this is consistent with the observation of 
Clark (1965) – cited above – that “In the ghetto…There is not the demand for abortion or for 
surrender  of  the  child  that  one finds  in  more  privileged  communities.”      To the  extent  that 
inequality  heightens  feelings  of  economic  despair  or  marginalization,  our  model  provides  a 
rationalization for the empirical finding. It also links our econometric analysis and findings to a 
vast array of social science research that has largely gone unexplored by economists. 
VII. FINAL DISCUSSION 
This  paper  has  presented  a  new  set  of  findings  regarding  the  large,  persistent  cross-
sectional  variation  in  teen  childbearing.  We  conducted  econometric  analyses  on  two  large, 
individual-level  datasets  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  income  inequality  –  and  other 
economic and social conditions -- relates to rates of early non-marital childbearing. We find that 
women who grew up in low socioeconomic status households are substantially more likely to 
have an early birth (outside of marriage in the United States) when income is more unequally 
distributed  in  their  location.  As  the  level  of  inequality  increases,  low  socioeconomic  status 
women are less likely to abort their pregnancies. We econometrically consider other aggregate-Kearney and Levine, p. 38 
level variables that might affect an individual’s perception of economic success, such as the 
absolute level of  income at the bottom  of the distribution and the college-high  school wage 
premium. We also considered aggregate-level variables that might be spuriously correlated with 
inequality and teen birth rates and thereby confound the interpretation of our primary results, 
such as the political leanings or religiosity of a place. The data do not support any of these 
alternative explanations.  
  The analysis and interpretations are guided by a model of economic despair that is built 
within  the  paradigm  of  a  utility  maximizing  rational  actor  and  based  on  the  insights  of 
anthropological  and  ethnographic  evidence.  When  a  poor  young  woman  perceives  that 
socioeconomic success is unachievable to her, she is more likely to embrace motherhood in her 
current  position,  as  there  is  little  option  value  to  be  gained  by  delaying  the  immediate 
gratification of having a baby. When there is relatively more hope of economic advancement, it 
is  relatively  more  desirable  to  delay  motherhood  and  invest  in  human  or  social  capital.  We 
propose that income inequality heightens any perceived sense of economic despair, and so this 
decision becomes even more common among poor women in more unequal places. Combining 
our  empirical  analyses  with  our  economic  model,  we  suggest  that  an  important  factor  in 
generating high rates of early, non-marital childbearing in the United States and, particularly, in 
some states with the United States is young women’s perceived lack of economic opportunity. 
  We offer the following caveats to the interpretation of our empirical results. First, though 
our model provides a  means to interpret the relationship  between  inequality and early,  non-
marital childbearing, it need not be the case that it explains the decision-making process of all 
individuals.  For  instance,  suppose  some  critical  mass  of  low-SES  individuals  responds  to 
inequality  in  the  way  posited  by  our  model.  Others  in  that  same  place  might  then  behave Kearney and Levine, p. 39 
similarly in response to this established social norm. In such a scenario, our model would be 
relevant to explaining the geographic patterns we observe in early non-marital childbearing, even 
though it would not account for the full magnitude of the effect.  
  Second, we have not investigated the precise channels through which inequality might 
lead to a greater sense of economic despair among adolescents. Various theories exist for how 
income  inequality,  as  distinct  from  absolute  income,  might  affect  individual-level  behavior. 
Social scientists, particularly political scientists and sociologists, have emphasized the role of 
relative, as distinct from absolute deprivation – in leading to acts of social unrest. In the recent 
economics literature, Luttmer (2005) has documented that people are less happy when they live 
around people who are richer than themselves. Watson and McLanahan (2011) present evidence 
that relative income matters for the marriage decision of low-income men. They interpret their 
model within the idea of an identity construct. We speculate here that there is an alternative 
channel  at  play.  To  the  extent  that  greater  levels  of  income  inequality  are  associated  with 
increased  levels  of  residential  and  institutional  segregation,  individuals  at  the  bottom  of  the 
income distribution will be more likely to feel a heightened sense of social marginalization, and 
hence economic despair.
26 This would link directly to the “social isolation” thesis of Wilson 
(1987). We think this is a promising area of future research that could lead to important insights 
into how income inequality affects the lives of the poor. 
  In conclusion, we have presented robust empirical evidence that income  inequality  is 
associated  with  higher  rates  of  early,  non-marital  childbearing  among  economically 
disadvantaged women. Our results suggest that inequality itself, as opposed to other correlated 
geographic  factors,  is  a  primary  driver  of  this  relationship.  We  have  proposed  a  model  of 
                                                 
26  Watson  (2009)  presents  evidence  that  as  income  inequality  has  increased  over  time,  cities  have  become 
increasingly segregated along income lines. Kearney and Levine, p. 40 
economic despair that could explain these findings: to the extent that income inequality leads to a 
heightened sense of economic despair among the poor, it will lead to higher rates of early, non-
marital childbearing among those at the bottom of the distribution. This could also be part of the 
explanation for why high-inequality states and countries see higher rates of a host of “drop out” 
behaviors, including lower educational attainment and higher rates of crime. We consider this a 
topic worthy of future research. 
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Table 1: Household Inequality Measures across States, 1980-2008 
Highest Inequality    Middle Inequality    Lowest Inequality 
State  Ratio 50/10    State  Ratio 50/10    State  Ratio 50/10 
DC  5.88    NJ  4.24    AZ  3.81 
LA  4.92    NM  4.19    ME  3.79 
NY  4.74    MI  4.18    AK  3.78 
AL  4.65    WV  4.18    MT  3.78 
MA  4.61    NC  4.16    IA  3.74 
MS  4.52    CT  4.14    NE  3.72 
GA  4.51    AR  4.13    WI  3.72 
KY  4.49    OH  4.10    WY  3.71 
SC  4.39    CA  4.09    VT  3.61 
RI  4.39    OK  4.08    ID  3.60 
TN  4.32    VA  4.05    NH  3.58 
IL  4.32    PA  4.03    NV  3.57 
TX  4.30    MO  4.00    UT  3.41 
      MD  3.95       
      CO  3.89       
      WA  3.89       
      DE  3.87       
      MN  3.86       
      HI  3.86       
      FL  3.85       
      KS  3.84       
      ND  3.84       
      SD  3.84       
      OR  3.83       
      IN  3.81       
Notes: The highest and lowest inequality groups are the top and bottom quartiles of states, respectively.  
The middle inequality group is the middle two quartiles of states. These values are calculated from 1970-
2008, using U.S. census and ACS data.  
Table 2: Household Inequality Measures across FFS Countries, 1976-2000 
Low Inequality    Middle Inequality    High Inequality 
Countries  Gini Coeff.    Countries  Gini Coeff.    Countries  Gini Coeff. 
Finland  0.230    Germany
*  0.296    Spain  0.325 
Austria
*  0.246          Italy  0.328 
Belgium  0.275          Greece  0.346 
            Portugal  0.367 
Notes:  Countries are divided by apparent breaks in the levels of the Gini coefficients (0.28 and 0.32).  The sample is 
restricted to non-Eastern bloc FFS countries with data on household composition in childhood and it also excludes 
the United States (whose Gini coefficient in these data is 0.380).  Gini coefficients for each country represent the 
average values of all reported Gini coefficients available from UNU-WIDER for each country, restricting the years 
considered  to  those  between  1976  and  2000 that  are  considered  to  be  of  high  quality,  and  that  cover  the  full 
population  of  households.    Countries  marked  with  an  asterisk  only  have  data  on  births,  not  other  pregnancy 
outcomes.    
    
Table 3:  Impact of Long-Term Inequality on  
Marital and Non-Marital Fertility Outcomes by Ages 20 and 25, by Socioeconomic Status 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
Non-Marital Outcomes  Marital Outcomes  “Shotgun 
Marriage” 
 

















by Age 20 
 
50/10 Ratio*  0.053  -0.006  -0.042  -0.026  -0.006  0.003  -0.018 
     Mom HS Dropout 
 
(0.015)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.009) 
50/10 Ratio*  0.021  -0.013  -0.013  -0.027  -0.004  0.002  -0.013 
Mom HS Graduate  (0.012)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
   
by Age 25 
 
50/10 Ratio*  0.040  -0.039  -0.022  -0.041  0.008  -0.010  -0.050 
     Mom HS Dropout 
 
(0.013)  (0.026)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.006)  (0.014) 
50/10 Ratio*  0.003  -0.049  -0.020  -0.026  0.002  -0.003  -0.021 
Mom HS Graduate  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.004)  (0.010) 
Notes:  reported standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Additional explanatory variables in each regression 
include maternal educational attainment, current age and age squared, race/ethnicity, an indicator variable for living 
with  a  single  parent  at age  14, the  state  unemployment rate  at age  19,  state  welfare  policies  (family  cap  and 
maximum  AFDC/TANF  benefit  for  a  family  of  3),  state  abortion  policies  (Medicaid  funding,  parental 
notification/consent, and mandatory delay laws), and an indicator variable for SCHIP implementation, along with 
state and cohort fixed effects.  The sample sizes are 24,720 and 23,037 in the models by age 20 and age 25, 
respectively. 
    
Table 4:  Impact of Long-Term Inequality on Fertility Outcomes by Ages 20 and 25,  
by Socioeconomic Status 























by Age 20 
 
Gini coefficient*  0.589  0.301  0.192  0.180  -0.111 
     Not Raised in Two Parent HH 
 
(0.157)  (0.116)  (0.048)  (0.059)  (0.015) 
Sample Size  29,671  23,042  15,546  15,546  15,546 
           
   
by Age 25 
 
Gini coefficient*  0.545  0.161  0.249  0.292  -0.010 
     Not Raised in Two Parent HH 
 
(0.181)  (0.172)  (0.138)  (0.163)  (0.112) 
Sample Size  29,846  22,686  15,509  15,509  15,509 
Notes: The full sample includes those women in the FFS outside of the Eastern bloc (with or without the United 
States, as indicated).  The restricted sample includes data from just the subset of non-US countries that also include 
information about conceptions and pregnancy failures.  Standard errors are clustered at the country level (see the 
text for a discussion of this). Table 5:  Impact of Alternative State Economic Conditions on  
Non-Marital Fertility by Ages 20 and 25, by Socioeconomic Status 
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by Age 20 
50/10 Ratio*  0.053  0.069  0.062  0.056  0.052  0.054 
     Mom HS Dropout  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.014) 
50/10 Ratio*  0.021  0.000  0.022  0.022  0.017  0.012 
Mom HS Graduate  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
State Characteristic*  ---  -0.065  0.028  0.028  0.049  -0.035 
    Mom HS Dropout  ---  (0.066)  (0.049)  (0.049)  (0.093)  (0.072) 
State Characteristic*  ---  0.076  0.003  0.005  0.128  0.097 
Mom HS Graduate  ---  (0.044)  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.058)  (0.060) 
 
by Age 25 
50/10 Ratio*  0.040  0.057  0.034  0.039  0.042  0.045 
     Mom HS Dropout  (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
50/10 Ratio*  0.003  -0.006  0.003  0.003  0.003  -0.006 
Mom HS Graduate  (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
State Characteristic*  ---  -0.064  -0.020  -0.021  -0.106  -0.089 
    Mom HS Dropout  ---  (0.055)  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.074)  (0.083) 
State Characteristic*  ---  0.030  0.001  0.001  -0.003  0.092 
Mom HS Graduate  ---  (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.046)  (0.059)  (0.064) 
Notes:  reported standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Additional explanatory variables in each regression include maternal educational attainment, 
current age and age squared, race/ethnicity, an indicator variable for living with a single parent at age 14, the state unemployment rate at age 19 or 24, state 
welfare policies (family cap, waiver/TANF implementation, and maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of 3), state abortion policies (Medicaid funding, 
parental notification/consent, and mandatory delay laws), and an indicator variable for SCHIP implementation, along with state and cohort fixed effects.  The 
specifications for non-marital fertility have a sample size of 24,720 and 23,037 by ages 20 and 25, respectively.     
Table 6:  Impact of Alternative State Characteristics on  
Non-Marital Fertility by Ages 20 and 25, by Socioeconomic Status 
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by age 20 
50/10 Ratio*  0.053  0.047  0.057  0.053  0.058  0.060  0.049 
     Mom HS Dropout  (0.015)  (0.019)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.016) 
50/10 Ratio*  0.021  0.019  0.019  0.010  0.012  0.021  0.015 
Mom HS Graduate  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.016) 
State Characteristic*  ---  0.131  -0.047  0.000  -0.004  0.001  -0.003 
    Mom HS Dropout  ---  (0.121)  (0.079)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.012) 
State Characteristic*  ---  0.038  0.043  0.001  0.009  0.001  -0.007 
Mom HS Graduate  ---  (0.095)  (0.061)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
 
by Age 25 
50/10 Ratio*  0.040  0.027  0.047  0.048  0.046  0.030  0.049 
     Mom HS Dropout  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.011) 
50/10 Ratio*  0.003  -0.008  0.002  -0.004  -0.004  0.001  -0.016 
Mom HS Graduate  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.017)  (0.021)  (0.020) 
State Characteristic*  ---  0.230  -0.089  -0.001  -0.009  0.001  0.019 
    Mom HS Dropout  ---  (0.123)  (0.074)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.015) 
State Characteristic*  ---  0.163  0.008  0.000  0.003  0.000  -0.013 
Mom HS Graduate  ---  (0.097)  (0.062)  (0.001)   (0.006)   (0.002)  (0.013) 
Notes:  reported standard errors are clustered at the state level.  Additional explanatory variables in each regression include maternal educational attainment, 
current age and age squared, race/ethnicity, an indicator variable for living with a single parent at age 14, the state unemployment rate at age 19 or 24, state 
welfare policies (family cap, waiver/TANF implementation, and maximum AFDC/TANF benefit for a family of 3), state abortion policies (Medicaid funding, 
parental notification/consent, and mandatory delay laws), and an indicator variable for SCHIP implementation, along with state and cohort fixed effects The 
specifications for non-marital fertility have a sample size of 24,720 and 23,037 by ages 20 and 25, respectively (and 19,797 and 18,940 for the poverty rate 
models).    
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Figure 1:  International Comparison of Teen Birth Rates, 2008














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2:  Variation in Teen Birth Rates across States, 2008
source:  Martin, et al. (2010) 
 
 





























Figure 3:  Income Inequality and Teen Birth Rates across Countries
United States
sources:  Gini Coefficient -United Nations (2009).  Teen Birth Rate - United Nations (2008)




























Figure 4: Income Inequality and Teen Birth Rates across States





















Figure 5:  Probability of Giving Birth by Age 20, by Marital Status
Non-Marital Marital All






















Figure 6:  Pregnancy Resolution for Non-Marital Conceptions by Age 20
Non-Marital Birth Marital Birth ("Shotgun Marriage") Pregnancy Failure












































Figure 7:  Fertility Outcomes by Age 20 in Selected FFS Countries
Conception Birth Pregnancy Failure































































Figure 8A:  Rate of Nonmarital Childbearing by Age 20, 
by Mother's Level of Education and State Level of Income Inequality


















































Figure 8B:  Rate of Nonmarital Conception by Age 20, 
by Mother's Level of Education and State Level of Income Inequality

































































Figure 8C: Rate of Nonmarital Pregnancy Failure by Age 20, 
by Mother's Level of Education and State Level of Income Inequality


















































Figure 9:  Rate of Childbearing by Age 20, 
by Parental Presence as a Child and National Level of Income Inequality
least inequality midrange inequality most inequality


























































Figure 10:  Relationship between Income Inequality and Mobility
Sources:  Gini Coefficient -UnitedNations (2009). Intergenerational earnings elasticity - Corak (2006). 
Data Appendix:  State/Year Policy and Economic Condition Variables 
 
This table lists the sources for the policy and economic condition variables included as control 
variables in our OLS regressions. 
Family cap 
 
  Information on this welfare waiver policy was obtained from three sources: 
(1) a technical report of the Council of Economic Advisers (1999); (2) an 
Urban Institute report written by Gallagher, et al. (1998); and (3) a report 
by Crouse (1999), prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, which summarizes information contained in a report of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (1997).  
 
Full source citations: Council of Economic Advisors. 1999. “Technical 
Report: Economic Expansion, Welfare Reform, and the Decline in Welfare 
Caseloads: An Update.” Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the 
President of the United States;  
Crouse, Gil. 1999.  “State Implementation of Major Changes to Welfare 
Policies, 1992-1998.” Washington, D.C.: Office of Human Services 
Policy, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services;  
Gallagher, L. Jerome, Megan Gallagher, Kevin Perese, Susan Schreiber, 
and Keith Watson. 1998. One Year after Federal Welfare Reform: A 
Description of State Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
Decisions as of October 1997.  Washington D.C.: Urban Institute, 




  Dates for state implementation of SCHIP were obtained from the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) website: 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/schip/enrollment/fy2000.pdf, accessed September 
2005. (All states implemented SCHIP by 1998, so these series did not 
require updating.)  
  
AFDC/TANF Benefit 
for 3-person Family 
 
  Data on welfare benefit levels were obtained from Council of Economic 
Advisers (1997) and Rowe, et al., (2004), Rowe and Russell (2004), and 
Rowe and Versteeg (2005). We update these series using data compiled by 
the  University  of  Kentucky  Center  for  Poverty  Research,  publically 
available on the Center’s website. They list their sources as Urban Institute 
2006-2009. 
 
Full source citations: Council of Economic Advisers.  1997.  Technical 
Report:  Explaining the Decline in Welfare Receipt, 1993-1996.  
Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President of the United States; 
Rowe, Gretchen, Kevin McManus, and Tracy Roberts.  2004. The Welfare 
Rules Databook: State Policy as of July 2001.  Washington, D.C.: The 
Urban Institute; Rowe, Gretchen with Victoria Russell.  2004. The Welfare 
Rules Databook: State Policy as of July 2002.  Washington, D.C.: The 
Urban Institute, October; Rowe, Gretchen with Jeffrey Versteeg.  2005. 
The Welfare Rules Databook: State Policy as of July 2003.  Washington, 
D.C.: The Urban Institute. 
 









these policies through 2006. Sources for those codings: Jennifer J. Frost, 
Adam Sonfield, and Rebecca Benson Gold. 2006. “Estimating the Impact 
of Expanding Medicaid Eligibility for Family Planning Services,” 
Occasional Report, New York: Guttmacher Institute, No. 28; and 
Guttmacher Institute. 2006.  “State Medicaid family planning eligibility 
expansions,” State Policies in Brief, New York: Guttmacher Institute.  
 
We update these series using information reported by recent Guttmacher 
state policies in brief factsheets, accessed through the website:  
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SMFPE.pdf. We verify 
this information using information posted on the Center for Medicaid and 
Medicare (CMS) website about Section 1115 state waivers: 
http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/MWDL/list.asp. 
(Accessed 10/14/10).  
 
Abortion restriction - 
Parental consent 
 
Abortion restriction – 
mandatory delay 
 
  Levine (2004) includes a detailed description of these restrictions and how 
the variables are coded. We updated Levine’s earlier series by comparing 
changes in legal status between 2004 and what is reported by Guttmacher 
as 2010 law. For the set of states with reported changes, we searched the 
state websites for information about dates of implementation: 
http://prochoiceamerica.org/government-and-you/state-governments/. 
 
Medicaid Abortion State 
funding restriction 
 
  Levine (2004) includes a detailed description of these restrictions and how 
the variables are coded. We updated Levine’s earlier series using 
information from NARAL, “Restrictions on Low Income Women's Access 
to Abortion”, accessed 10/15/10: http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-
is-choice/fast-facts/low-income-women.html 
 
state unemployment rate    Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) 
program.   
 
 
 
 
 